Last month or so, Dan asked me to make my case that the Religious Right is a threat to the United States. His contention was not that the Religious Right was good, but rather that, while an "embarrassment" and a "nuisance", they weren't sufficiently influential to merit the epithet "threat" . While considering how to make my case (and with the help of a little cross-examination by Doug), I became overwhelmed by how much of the debate Dan and I have left undefined, so before I make any case, I'd like to refine what the case is, just so's we can have a good platform to wrestle on. Who knows, once we've done that, Dan and I may even find that we agree.
So, here is a breakdown of my thesis, "The Religious Right is a threat to this country", as I understand it.
1) When I say "the Religious Right", I am talking about a group of pundits, politicians, and political organizations - as well as the ordinary members of the electorate in their sway - who attempt to influence policy within the United States with the intention of turning their specific, Christian morality into the law of the land.
2) When I say "this country", I am referring to the set of Enlightenment ideas (as I understand them) that the founders had in mind as they declared their independence from Britain and as they debated, wrote, and signed the Constitution that was ratified by each of the United States and is accepted as the legal foundation of those United States. Chief among those beliefs is the idea of Liberty, the idea that an individual has the right to do whatever s/he wants as long as those choices don't infringe on the rights of others, that consenting adults are best at determining what behavior is best for them.
3) When I say "threat", I am saying that I think the agenda of the Religious Right - banning abortion, keeping the morning after pill off the shelves, attempting to limit sex-education to abstinence-only, banning gay marriage - is antithetical to the ideas set forth in the Declaration of Independence, the Federalist Papers, and the Constitution, not the least of which is that the strength of this country, of a Democracy, is a free, independent, well-informed citizenry.
Now, if Dan is in agreement with those premises, then I would say this:
Any national movement whose aim is to enact legislation which is fundamentally at odds with the principles on which its host nation was founded and which, if enacted, would fundamentally change the nature and character of its host nation is, by definition, a threat to its host nation.
Now, I think that's a pretty good case, and I'm not anticipating any argument with it, but let me just say at this point that I'm certainly open to debating any of what I've written above.
However, if there is no argument with what I've said above, that the agenda of the Religious Right is inherently threatening to Enlightenment Ideals and that those Enlightenment Ideals are, in my opinion, essential to the character of the US as we know it, then let me allude finally to my post title and recast the terminology of the debate: I think, for the purposes of this argument, that my position is better represented by the phrase "Credible Threat" and Dan's position is more accurately represented by the phrase "Empty Threat".
And if all of that is kosher, then I ask Dan to weigh in on what it takes to make a Credible Threat. Perhaps some examples of Credible Threats in other areas?
We await Dan's response via comment or his blog...
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Hmm. I hope this generates a response.
ReplyDeleteAs far as founding principles, yes, it was the era of the Enlightenment, but those thinkers were a diverse bunch and I doubt very many of them accorded the individual as much respect as you do -- that notion of the autonomous individual really belongs more to the Romantic period. In fact, to many major thinkers of the Enlightenment, the "mob" remained a threat, if you offer greater liberties, you're also risking pitchforks at your doorstop when people think you're a witch.
I don't think there are founding principles, per se, or really, I believe it's a myth to see them as cohesive. You had group of men, some of whom, in terms of the spectrum, came down hard on the side of individual liberty, and others who sought to check the more dangerous, volatile aspects of human behavior. It's just that many of them recognized that governments, institutions, and cultures could be just as volatile and selfish and unenlightened as people.
Certainly, there was a feeling among many Enlightenment thinkers that cultural progress was possible and that reason could somehow liberate us not from selfishness but from the harmful pursuits of our own selfish interests and from the irrational aspects of our culture.
It becomes a little tricky to map out how an only vaguely coherent group such as the religious right can somehow work against a rather unfixed, fluid, and disparate set of principles as you'll find outlined in in the writings of our 18th century political thinkers.
Remember, after all, that the notion of liberty itself, the one that perhaps most strongly guides us even now, is often traced to the Protestant Revolution, in which education and an individual relationship with God superceded the all too human workings of the church and its officers. But the case was never simply one of, what do we do to make people free, but how do we make people more rational or bring them closer to higher ethics or values or even to God? It just turned out that to many of the Protestants and Protestant raised leaders, the answer lay in individual liberty but only as a means to an end. You were accorded inalienable rights, in the minds of some, not simply so that you might decide to spend your life drinking and whoring, but so that you could pursue higher ambitions without drinking and whoring politicians standing in your way.
I still think the position as stated is too broad. Are there specific incidences in which specific groups or people are shown both to have done something harmful or tried to do something harmful? Good enough, but can we then go on to show that these groups have enough influence on the government so that we might be concerned?
In my most cynical moments, I know well that it is often easier to bamboozle people through religion than through reason. Far, far easier, and this is why populist politicians wear the halo. But is this religion in any authentic case or is it snake oil and political theater? Make no mistake, politics IS theater. Tragedy, mostly, unfortunately.
Surely, it is possible to be both sincerely religious and to embrace some of the hodgepodge of ideas in the big tent known as conservatism. Bear in mind: it is often the conservatives who come in for individual liberty. Although it is often in a purely economic sense, it is the a religious left, historically, who go in more for social engineering, brain washing, and more explicit forms of propaganda.
It's four a.m. and I'll leave it at that for now. I need to take a nap before my seminar this morning at UML. Please take this all as a little off the cuff as I just stumbled out of bed for a drink of water and found this. I couldn't help but to respond in some form and kick off the discussion.
I'm actually going to take it as a lot off the cuff. All of it is worth discussion on its own, but very little of it counts as a direct response to my thesis. Quick examples:
ReplyDelete1. Doug: It becomes a little tricky to map out how an only vaguely coherent group such as the religious right can somehow work against a rather unfixed, fluid, and disparate set of principles as you'll find outlined in in the writings of our 18th century political thinkers.
I defined Religious Right fairly specifically, and I outlined the kind of legislation that characterizes the kind of people to whom I'm referring. It's probable that I've mischaracterized the conflict as between people rather than between opposing currents in the ongoing social conversation, but I think it was an understandable misstep on my part to attack the vehicles of the bad ideas rather than the ideas themselves. That said, I don't think the complexity of the group that advocates for these ideas in any way diminishes the threat that the ideas themselves pose.
Would it satisfy if I modified my definition to be simply "the human advocates of the bad ideas", whether those humans are cohesive in any other way or not (though I would offer that they are cohesive in a fundamental way: for whom they vote).
2. Doug: I still think the position as stated is too broad. Are there specific incidences in which specific groups or people are shown both to have done something harmful or tried to do something harmful? Good enough, but can we then go on to show that these groups have enough influence on the government so that we might be concerned?
This is handled in the last part of my post where I recast the argument as "Empty Threat" v. "Credible Threat", is it not? This is exactly where I am proposing that Dan take the argument, and I have refined my position to the "Credible Threat" one, Mr. Too- tired- at- 4- in- the- morning- to- read- to- the- end- of- the- post.
Finally, I don't mean to suggest that the Founders were monolithic and single-minded. To the contrary, I know that they were not. However, when having any discussion about social phenomena and movements of people, we have to simplify. For example, we have to assume that all of the principal architects of our country held "these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." Because that's what the record they left us says.
So for purposes of discussion, I'm not sure any of your "cohesion" arguments matter. No movement, be it the founders of this country, the Religious Right, or viewers of Jon Stewart, is completely homogeneous, but disqualifying any common definition of those groups on the basis that it doesn't account for all of their differences would make any definition, and therefore any conversation, impossible.
If we want to go back and attack my presumptions about "the American Way", we can do that, but I'm really hoping that it's not necessary. I truly don't want to get bogged down in an argument that would keep a roomful of lawyers at it all night, citing the primary documents as well as the 200 years of Supreme Court case history that goes along with it. Is it really necessary for me to lay out every axiom on which my general philosophy is founded to verify that they are acceptable? Can't we just accept that the Supreme Court made the right decision in Lawrence v. Texas and accept that the Religious Right thinks they did not?
Gentlemen:
ReplyDeleteAdam, I salute your salient reframing of the question. I think from here we can be more fruitful. I had left off with a challenge to flesh out the threat by fleshing out its components:
a) what is the possible bad thing that we are talking about? why is it to be considered bad?
b) how likely is it that the bad thing shall come to pass?
Adam, your framing goes to establishing a) and then making the question at issue b). In other words, the bad thing--the threat--is the Religious Right enacting legislation that is at odds with the Enlightenment and other ideals that have made our country "our country." And the question is thus whether the threat is credible or empty. You and I do indeed seem to assess this likelihood differently, and this difference of assessment is what most interests me to explore. So as a matter of going forward this is where I propose we begin (at least one leg) of argument. I take up your challenge of claiming it is not likely, below.
In passing, though, I would like to address your definition of the threat, as Doug has done (albeit it is clear to me that Doug is more knowledgeable than I am on this matter). On your points:
1) Definition of the "Religious Right." I find this definition to be quite serviceable. We can flesh it out further, if pressed, with names of groups, their mission statements, their positions (some of which you already stated), and their champions -- but I think we can leave this as is for now.
2) Definition of "this country." This is indeed a big messy thing, and I share Doug's queasiness about the definition as offered, on two counts: one, that there was wide difference of opinion, as Doug mentions, and also, two, that even where there was consensus, that consensus was at odds with what we today consider "our country." For example, it was most probably the consensus of the Founders [if not of their ideals], that slavery was okay, that women should not vote, that the federal government's role should be severely limited, etc. I am admittedly talking about the _people_, not the ideals. (And this is the half-assed, nitpicky objection that I was forwarding previously, which I then dropped as uninteresting to me and don't intend to pick up again here.) Doug has gone directly (given his greater knowledge) at the ideals themselves, and how it is not yet established that they were and are the basis of "this country" as we would probably all roughly agree to define "this country." This line of discussion also interests me, but I feel my ignorance of any political theory post 8th grade civics class, and have to step back and spectate on any continuation of this discussion. I would suggest that we find a definition of "this country" that better satisfies us, so we can proceed. I suspect that it lies as much in the 20th century as the 18th. Getting at this definition is our most difficult task, as I see it.
3) Definition of threat as tendency to establish policies and laws that are antithetical to our ideals. Okay. But I think this is maybe setting the bar for "threat" a little low (and thus perhaps explains our different assessments of how likely such a threat is to come to pass). By this definition, it seems that the establishment of a single policy or law that is antithetical to the ideals of this country dooms the entirety of "this country." To me, it seems that "threat" to "this country" indicates a shadow that extends beyond the instant violation of ideals itself. That is, one must claim a slippery slope, or the altering of an essential pervasive element, or removal of some keystone. An actual realized threat to this country should be something that makes this country no longer this country. Something on the order of slavery (in retrospect), or a 1984-ish police state, or a tax rate of 99% on any income above $1 million / year. To use some of the examples we are kicking around, if the Supreme Court were to overturn Roe v Wade, would a "threat" to "our country" have been realized? I say no, (thinking that what I consider to be "our country" did indeed exist prior to 1973 -- whereas I would say that what I consider to be "our country" did not properly exist prior to the emancipation of slaves.) Perhaps you say yes, using what seems perhaps to be a different definition of "threat" and thus a lower bar. I think we need to discuss this a bit, in order to proceed fruitfully.
Anyway, now I see I should take back my promise to take up the assessment of the likelihood of "the threat" to "this country." "This country" we can maybe fumble around with and shape as we go along (and this is grand and worthy fumbling, I think we'd agree), but the definition of "threat" that we should be using is still unclear to me.
To end on some specificity to illustrate my confusion and difficulty, Adam you mention the Lawrence v. Texas case. I certainly agree that the
Supreme Court made the right decision (or at least one that I think is best for our country) and agree that the Religious Right thinks it was wrong and would fain overturn it. What I am confused about is what if the Supreme Court had ruled for Texas, or had refused to hear the case in the first place for whatever reason, thus granting the status quo victory to Texas? This situation would have represented--indeed, this situation all of US history prior to that decision DID represent--an actual realization of the "threat." Would this not have been--was this not--this country then?
One escape from all of this is just to pose the question as straight factual assessments, e.g.
What is the likelihood of each of the following happening in the next ten years:
-Roe v Wade is overturned
-Gay marriage is banned by Constitutional amendment
-Federal money is withheld by law from any school that mentions contraception methods other than abstinence
-etc.
I say less than 20% for each the above. (Okay, less than 30% for etc.)
But I suspect such plain handicapping is not what we are about here.
Rereading my response, I think most of it is quite accurate and I did in fact read the credible versus empty threat part and it's hard for me to get my head around how it negates what you list as point 2. Perhaps it does -- I just don't see it despite looking.
ReplyDeletePart of the reason we distinguish idea from person is because otherwise we risk a form of the ad hominem attack, and there's countless material on why this is a philosophical can of worms aside from simply qualifying as a logical fallacy and I think the general consensus against its use to avoid it is so well established as to be beyond argument. In philosphy, and we are in the realm of political philosophy since you are relying on reasoned argument made in a good faith effort to establish truth, you are constrained to the ideas themselves.
The consensus against "essentialism" isn't quite as strong, but it is solid enough so that we have to anticipate objections on this front.
Yes, we can generally characterize periods and bodies of thought for the purposes of clarification. We can even characterize the ideas of social groups, of course. Even given this, the general bent of nearly ALL religious zealots stands in direct opposition to nearly ALL Enlightenment thinkers by definition. Even boiled to some essence, the Englightement thinker and the religious zealot both hold to some form of invidual liberty and freedom. Nearly all people believe in the value of freedom and nearly all people believe that reasonable limits need to be applied to it as to minimize the threats to social order, the strong tyrannizing the weak, etc. The squabble is never over whether freedom is good, but where the limits lie, and, in that sense, there simply is no consensus among the Enlightenment thinkers.
You don't have to lay out the entire foundation of philosophy to begin an argument, but I simply suggest that most contemporary philosophers would have a hard time with the notion that there is an essential, ahistorical nature of America that we can appeal to. Such appeals generally have to do with establishing a myth, seemingly about the past but actually in the service of what needs to get taken care of politically right now.
Why? Well, Lawrence v. Texas is a good case in point. No 18th c court would have ruled the way the courts did, even one ruled by the most progressive man of his age. Therefore, you can't say the court was working with the exact notion of liberty borrowed from Enl. jurists. You can make the argument that the Texas court was working in that spirit, but this is now, as you see, in the realm of spirit. Nothing wrong with that: but it becomes clear that adherence to this spirit is really more a matter of pragmatism (and pragmatism, not Enlightenment thought, forms the basis for most jurisprudence in this country during the last century) than of the clear articulation of an idea presumably once pure and now sullied.
Here, alas, is the can of worms. If you were to state that a certain idea is foolish or unjust or unfair or impractical, and give me a few examples of why you think this is the case, then that is well and good. But if you tell me an idea is somehow "unamerican," well, then you really do have to drag in a massive apparatus and fend off the red flags raised by philosophers. Rush Limbaugh might invoke it and all his listeners know exactly what he means. A philosophical lister remains confounded. Perhaps the dittohead is smarter.
Now, any position that involves complexity requires books rather than blog entries to articulate it, and this is why political blogs are political rather than philosophical in any real sense. If I don't directly refute your thesis, well, that isn't the sort of work that is required here as it's not the thesis but its explication that confounds me somewhat, and I really am not simply trying to state my own views but to try to represent the objections that would likely be raised by a presumably intelligent person working within the Anglo-American tradition.
However, if that type of involved discussion seems distasteful to you and feels like the room of lawyers you cite, then I can simply drop the matter and wait for others to either read mum or comment in turn.
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ReplyDeleteJust wanted to draw your attention to the time stamps -- I was working on my comment while Dan was posting his -- didn't want to make it seem as though I was ignoring his contribution here.
ReplyDeleteUnderstood (already). Note appreciated.
ReplyDeleteYou guys are both dicks...No! Not dicks...what's the other one there...Gentlemen!
ReplyDeleteRe-reading Adam's initial post here, let me offer another easy (and thus uninviting) way out of our disagreement. Adam says that "...perhaps Dan and I may even find we agree." To that end, let me say that IF we further distill Adam's thesis as follows:
ReplyDelete"1) The Religious Right's desired set of law and policy is not _fully_ in keeping with Enlightenment ideals, and 2) there is a _more_than_negligible_ chance that at least _some_ item of law or policy forwarded by the Religious Right not fully in keeping with Enlightenment ideas may come to pass."
...THEN, yes, I do agree. Doug, I imagine you do too, no? So, but let's get back to the disagreements and thence discussion.